中美關係的鴿派緩和讓位於地緣政治現實
A dovish détente gives way to geopolitical gravity
中美科技競爭正令以擴大 Nvidia 在華市場份額為重心的鴿派緩和路線讓位;黃仁勳被迫辭職,凸顯企業領袖介入中美關係所面對的張力。美國國會可能進一步收緊對華科技制裁,為特朗普與習近平之間脆弱的貿易休戰帶來風險。文章亦指出,美國策略愈來愈依賴私營企業領袖,但政府不能假定其利益與國家利益一致。
To be a China “hawk,” Jensen Huang declared last year, is a “badge of shame.”
The former Nvidia CEO was a proud dove, one who found a dovish partner in US President Donald Trump — quite literally, in a business sense. Together, they formed an enterprise that aimed to sell high-end Nvidia chips to China, with the US government taking a cut of the profits.
Their alliance represented the high-water mark of a Sino-US détente — peak dovishness, where a prime consideration in the White House was expanding Nvidia’s market share, not blocking China’s AI ambitions. Asked on CNN if it mattered who won the AI superpower race, Huang replied “I don’t think it does.”
That moment has come and gone. A trade that not only sent powerful chips into China via legal channels, but also billions of dollars of hardware illicitly through Chinese-funded companies in Southeast Asia — one of the most active, Megaspeed, set up by a suspected Chinese intelligence asset with whom Huang was having an affair — has run headlong into the hard realities of US-China strategic competition.
Their superpower rivalry is structural. Its main focus is technology and, whatever Huang says, AI has made the struggle existential.
At times, Trump has seemed confused about the geostrategic stakes. In arguing for a let-it-rip approach to frontier AI model development, he has several times invoked the China bogeyman by insisting that “Whoever wins AI, wins.”
Yet he pushed Huang and chip sales to China into the forefront of his diplomacy with Beijing.
In May, Trump scrambled Huang onto Air Force One at the last minute to join his business entourage in Beijing at a Sino-US summit, reportedly despite knowing that his intelligence services were aware of the Nvidia CEO’s potential links to a suspected Chinese intelligence asset.
Then in September, Huang was at the head table with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at a state banquet in Washington.
Huang would likely be with Trump in Shenzhen this week at a meeting of Asia-Pacific leaders if he hadn’t been forced to resign.
Instead, the prospect of the US Congress ratcheting up tech sanctions against China will hang over Trump’s third meeting this year with Xi, and could endanger their fragile trade truce.
Beijing, at least, is clear-eyed about the nature of its competition with Washington. Although over the longer term Huang’s spectacular fall may hold back US innovation and economic dynamism — a plus for China — the short-term consequences of a tightening embargo on semiconductors and chipmaking equipment would be immensely damaging. For all its advances in critical industries, China remains heavily dependent on American IP.
In retrospect, as my colleague Reed Albergotti argued, Huang’s mistake was to get mixed up in politics in Washington, where he had a target on his back. His defenders see a conspiracy involving the US intelligence services to bring down America’s foremost business supporter of engagement with China. Elon Musk posted on X that he would sign a petition reinstating Huang. Epic Games founder Tim Sweeney said his exit showed an “Apple firing Steve Jobs level of idiocy.”
The broader question is the appropriate role for US business leaders in forging a relationship between rival superpowers whose economies are nevertheless deeply entwined through innovation networks, finance channels, and human talent. US strategy, writes Julian Gewirtz, a scholar at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, “has come to depend, to an extraordinary degree, on powerful private-sector actors whose incentives the government cannot simply assume will align with the national interest.”
In Trump’s lame-duck presidency, that issue will be taken up by an incensed Congress pushing bipartisan bills aimed at China. The doves have had their time to shape the US-China agenda. Now, geopolitical gravity takes over.
來源:Semafor · semafor.com