Binance 説明假招聘面試及內部 AI 工具遭入侵與約 $6.34 billion 資產失竊的關聯

Binance said in initial findings published November 3, 2026, that fake recruitment interviews, malicious developer software and a compromised internal AI tool preceded the theft of approximately $6.34 billion in digital assets on October 29, 2026.

The exchange will absorb the financial impact rather than pass it to users. Binance reported setting aside more than 100% of the funds required to cover the loss, replenishing 98% of impacted token assets as of October 31, 2026, and freezing or intercepting approximately $2.85 billion, subject to reconciliation and market-price volatility. It is purchasing the outstanding, less-liquid assets.

The Proof of Reserves page cited for the replenishment describes 1:1 backing for custodial user assets. It uses Merkle-tree records and zk-SNARK proofs so users can verify that their balances are included in the liabilities report.

The findings remain initial. The investigation is ongoing, independent review is pending, and Binance is withholding some technical details to avoid helping malicious actors plan attacks.

Months of Access Before the Wallet Attack

In June 2026, a wallet DevOps engineer downloaded a tampered Homebrew installation while attempting to install a popular AI coding tool found through a search engine. Binance detected the anomaly, replaced the device and rotated related credentials, but the engineer’s role and colleagues on the wallet infrastructure team had already been exposed to the attacker.

In September 2026, another software engineer was contacted through a legitimate job-hunting platform by someone posing as a project director. A live video interview with a purported human-resources representative was followed by a second interview in a popular social chat app with someone claiming to be the CEO of a fictitious company. Near its end, the engineer was instructed to download an assignment containing a malicious code repository onto a work computer. Its code executed during setup.

The malware replaced a legitimate pyenv component with a malicious version and communicated with an attacker-controlled server. Binance said endpoint protection did not detect the zero-day malware at the time, while the attacker took steps to conceal the activity and remove traces of the compromise.

On October 20, 2026, the attacker used the second engineer’s compromised computer and an internal AI tool to extend control to the original DevOps engineer and another wallet software engineer. A container-deployment permission token was then found on the DevOps engineer’s computer. Between 17:15 and 19:56 UTC on October 29, the attacker logged into the third engineer’s computer, used credentials stolen from the DevOps engineer, deployed a container and triggered the malicious script that launched the wallet attack.

On-Chain Authorizations Complicated Containment

The attacker used unauthorized access to an internal wallet-signing service to initiate transactions outside Binance’s normal withdrawal process. Between 20:05 and 20:09 UTC, five Binance hot wallets sent 233.46 million XRP to an attacker-controlled address. Subsequent outflows came from Solana and Optimism hot wallets, and a Binance hot wallet sent 18,270 Bitcoin to an attacker-controlled address.

The attacker also exploited Ethereum’s EIP-7702 authorization mechanism, which lets an account delegate certain execution rights to a smart contract without exposing its private key. Fifty signing transactions manipulated the account nonce and established malicious delegation authorizations, giving an attacker-controlled contract partial execution rights over a Binance hot wallet. Those authorizations allowed assets to keep moving independently of the exchange’s withdrawal infrastructure.

Consequently, suspending withdrawals and shutting down hot-wallet services did not invalidate the existing on-chain permissions. Because the wallet used multi-party computation, there was no single private key available for immediate revocation, requiring a specialized procedure that took additional time. The final unauthorized transfer, 2,961.9 Ether, finalized on-chain at 23:56 UTC after previously remaining pending; no further unauthorized transfers were observed afterward. At 00:10 UTC on October 30, 2026, Binance executed a new authorization from its Binance14 hot wallet to the zero address, clearing the malicious delegation code.

Rebuilt Systems and a Separate FBI Attribution

As of November 3, Binance had rebuilt the affected wallet system in a new environment and rebuilt the affected internal AI tool and its access controls. It also replaced affected devices, decommissioned related credentials and tokens, completed enhanced scans across employee devices, expanded AI-based behavioral-anomaly detection and strengthened wallet-service risk controls.

Independent third-party cybersecurity experts are being engaged to validate the findings and recommend additional measures. Binance is increasing investment in AI-enabled detection, endpoint protection, developer-environment security and behavioral monitoring. It is also working to establish a security research fund and targeted initiatives with AI companies, industry participants and security firms focused on AI security in blockchain environments.

In a separate notice dated October 31, 2026, the FBI said North Korea’s TraderTraitor actors were responsible, that the bureau and its USSS and IRS-CI partners had observed them converting stolen assets primarily into Ether, and that further laundering was expected through DeFi and instant-swap services. The agencies urged node operators, exchanges, DeFi services, blockchain analytics firms and other virtual-asset providers to block transactions involving or derived from the listed addresses.

The account leaves a containment problem that extends beyond malware detection: replacing the first compromised device did not end the attacker’s exposure to the wallet team, and suspending withdrawals did not remove on-chain authority. The independent review now becomes the check on both Binance’s reconstruction of that chain and whether its rebuilt controls address it.